From a genealogical point of view, biotechnologies may bring a new epistemological perspective on what can possibly emerge from the movement of scientific research itself. Nevertheless, before analyzing any scientific discourse, it seems more meaningful to come back first of all to the rough material of research in play in this specific area. That is, starting from the perspective of the scientist in the laboratory and being aware of her experimental choices, the negative and positive results but also the errors, and finally the real but potentially hidden outcome, that we call here "secretions." Indeed, one problem according to Bachelard and Canguilhem, are science secretions, understood not as concrete productions but in terms of what they convey. These science secretions can lead to a scientific ideology to be considered mainly as an obstacle for the construction of ideas. As biotechnological terminology has both restricted and enlarged definitions, it is necessary to define what are the main biological modifications or transformations we will discuss here. Further, we chose not to arbitrarily study any subfield of biotechnologies, but rather (thanks to personal work and experience) to position our theoretical intervention into a known and polemically charged field: the field of cloning technology. In the cloning field, we observe that ideology displays two aspects: first, a seductive discourse as a social practice without any internal foundation, and second, an internal attitude of censoring the very creativity of biotechnical processes preventing them from any risk of exposure.
such emerging secretions from this most ambiguous creative movement of research in biotechnologies that starts with life, goes through history while carrying its own ideology, and has to come back to life with the absolute prescription of being effective. In particular, we will study the impact of a scientific practice in which the discourse is not tearing itself away from scientific secretions but co-emerging with them. This will lead us to question the possibility of an emerging pre-political topology of production of biotechnological entities that would allow in some conditions the emergence of a new political assemblage between, on the one hand, a new way of being alive for engineered bioproductions, and on the other, the history of such technological and scientific practices. The final point will be then to identify the boundaries of this pre-political topology, the main reason being that scientific practices might not be reduced to social practices.
The cloning context: "between successes and doubts"
The cloning technique provides a mode of reproduction of a selected genome and allows the production of viable cloned animals expected to share a genetically identical genome. The ability to take an adult cell and use the nucleus to undertake a new development by transferring it into an oocyte previously enucleated has been considered a great technicalscientific success (Wilmut et al., 1997) . Dolly the sheep was born in December 1996 , and the number of clones has been increasing ever since. Yet, the success rate as a reproduction technique remains quite low. Less than 5% of the reconstructed embryos after nuclear transfer reach the birth stage in mammals, and both biological and health outcomes are at best partial, a fact illustrated as early as 2002 in the title of a review by Jean-Paul Renard, et al.: "Nuclear Transfer Technologies: Between Successes And Doubts." Many scientific papers report that cloned animals frequently exhibit developmental abnormalities before birth. Those that survive to adulthood often display phenotypical variations in birth weight, size, coat, color, but also physiological differences and malformations (Wilmut, 2006; Chavatte-Palmer et al., 2002 and 2007) . Such variations or abnormalities suggest that cloned animals may not share the same genome as a consequence of defects or deregulations associated with in vitro culture steps (in vitro culture of the cell giving the donor nucleus; in vitro culture of the reconstructed embryo after nuclear transfer into an enucleated oocyte) (de Montera, 2009) . Despite these doubts about the real impact of the technique in the long run on the animal's health and quality, bovine clones are assumed to be "normal" if they pass the test of birth. Consequently, leading industrial nations lent their economical and political support to clone production. Both Japan before 2003 and the United States since 2008 have authorized the introduction of bovine clones into animal populations for breeding and food (Fox, 2008) . For its part, after longs debates, the EEC parliament voted in 2010 on a five-year moratorium.
In order to provide valuable arguments to both scientific inquiry and social debates, we developed our evidence-based epistemological research around the definition of the status of such new animals. As Canguilhem explains, in scientific research facts must not be collected exclusively based on a simple phenomenology of observation, but instead have to be generated by research in order to be actually informative about the process of research itself (Canguilhem, 1977) . We performed our experimental work with the aim of understanding the real outcome of the cloning technique by providing data on characteristics of adult bovine clones, which are not only experimental animals since they are expected to be used for applications directly concerning citizens via food production.
Facts from an experimental research
We decided to examine the identity of clones by using experimental research. The first reason for doing so is that it constitutes the purpose of their production for several applications (identical animals for experimentation and models for human diseases; faithful reproduction of genetically modified genomes; conservation of genomes by cloning in endangered species). Second, examining the identity of clones is useful for the purpose of our epistemological reflection about this new kind of animal (de Montera, 2003) .
As mentioned above, somatic cloned animals derived from the same donor genome (said to share the same "genotype") are generally considered genetically identical. However, an in-depth investigation of the genetic identity between clones derived from the same donor genome remains poorly documented. To complement scientific information, we have applied protocols of molecular biology in order to reveal possible genetic differences between 10 Holstein cows of the same genotype, including five living adult cows and five aborted fetuses (that were considered "abnormal" or "pathological"). A global approach of the genome of the clones did not reveal detectable genetic differences between the clones due to mutations. However, when using other markers (microsatellites), two mutations in two different markers were evidenced in one dead fetus during the perinatal period. When such microsatellite investigation was extended to 25 other cloned cows from four different genotypes, a third case of microsatellite mutation in one healthy adult cloned cow was detected. Our data suggests that the observed mutation incidence may be related to the cloning procedure as a consequence of an induced instability in the genome, especially during the in vitro culture of the reconstructed embryo. However, in order to be able to reach a conclusion, a larger experiment must be undertaken (de Montera, 2009 ).
In order to be able to undergo a new development while it is transferred into an oocyte, a successful cloning requires an epigenetic reprogramming of the donor cell nucleus belonging to an adult animal. Epigenetic reprogramming means that it is not a reprogramming of the genetic sequence of the DNA but of marks that interact with DNA and are involved in the regulation of gene expression and therefore gene function. Methylation is a mark on DNA (mainly an addition of a methyl group -CH3 on the cytosine base of DNA sequence) and plays a main role in the regulation of gene expression. The incorrect reprogramming of epigenetic marks such as DNA methylation frequently occurs in cloned embryos and is associated with compromised prenatal development and postnatal abnormalities (Yang et al., 2007) . Yet, the epigenetic status of clones that survive into adulthood was assumed to be normal and bovine clones were expected to be used in global food production (Fox, 2008) . However, the epigenetic status of such healthy adult clones had never been investigated.
We decided to compare the genomes of clones in terms of global methylation content not with the purpose of having an answer about their genome identity but to establish a relation between the functioning of their genomes. Our results showed that global DNA methylation levels of 38 healthy adult bovine clones are highly variable between individuals of the same genotype (sharing the same DNA sequence exception made of the reported mutations in microsatellites), in comparison with monozygotic twins (obtained by sectioning an embryo into two parts, each expecting to share the same DNA sequence) (de Montera et al., 2010) . We used a technique to measure the methylation level (5methyl-cytosine content) in white blood cells DNA from healthy female clones from one to eight years of age. To quantify the contribution of cloning to the observed variability between clones, we compared clones with female twins of similar age, the difference between the two groups being the cloning procedure. Strikingly, we found that the estimated variability (variance) in methylation level within clone genotypes was higher than within twins. The DNA methylation levels in the great majority of clones were also higher than in twins. The comparison with twins confirmed a cloning effect illustrated by a clone-specific variability of DNA methylation and provided new evidence of higher levels in clones.
These data clearly demonstrate that even apparently healthy clones must be considered not as identical beings having genomes functioning in the same way, but as "epigenome variants" (de Montera et al., 2010) . This means that a part of their genome is functioning differently, which might have a greater impact on their physiology, their aspect (phenotype) and their health in the long run, than subtle mutations of the DNA sequence. Another important point was discovered here: these results also mean that the genome of clones is plastic-it can undergo important variations and still be compatible with life. The biological relevance of this epigenetic plasticity is now under investigation. The data presented here also raises a new line of inquiry about epigenetic mark heritability and opens up two main paths: the identification of epigenetic variables in the genome and their possible trans-generational effects on clone offspring, and the perturbation by these epigenetic variables on the inactivation of undesirables sequences located in the genome of mammals, like for instance retroviral sequences.
Empirical material and phenomenological methodology
As specified in the introduction, our purpose here will not be to exclusively analyze scientific findings but also larger theoretical questions that emerge from the whole process of cloning. Emerging secretions depend on the environment in which the cloning process takes place. If we want to understand the global outcome of a scientific practice, the question becomes: what do we have to take into account and what do we have to reject? In a laboratory where cloning is performed, the main scientific parameters that can be used to identify the global outcome are: cleavage rates (when the egg reconstructed after nuclear transfer into an oocyte begins to divide itself), blastocyst rates (when the cloned embryo reaches the stage of about a hundred cells and can be implanted into the uterus of a recipient mother), birth rates (which among them will reach gestation term and successfully pass the cataclysmic event of birth?), and all the physiological following of newborns and young clones as they are most fragile at their beginnings (de Montera, 2007) . Of course, as we have explained, all the molecular biology work performed on tissues and cells derived from cloned embryos and animals has produced data on genetics, gene expression, and epigenetics, establishing a growing knowledge of the genome's structure and function for such biotechnological entities.
So far, these scientific parameters sound of enough importance and complexity to draw a first map of the abilities of cloning and associated genomics (the science of the genome) in the context of integrative biology. Yet, in terms of knowledge production, scientific reflection, and meaning, the following question remains: is there any localization in the area of science corresponding to what the lab researcher is filled with, enriched or disappointed by, and, whether accepting it or not, finally understands?
What indeed may interest an epistemologist willing to understand the movement of research itself in a precise field is not only data and figure production, selection, and publication, but what is emerging with them, yet not constituting a concrete or objective result at first sight? To put it differently, the question is: what is "escaping" from all the available data? A problem with this definition of what would be the ideal material for epistemology in this field is the obvious difficulty in defining a heterogeneous and mixed grouping. Nevertheless, as long as we do not find a contradiction between hypotheses and conclusions, we assume that it is possible pursue a methodology using a material for understanding made of what the lab researcher acquires from his practice while he is performing it: her experimental choices, the results he gets not separable from the manipulator; but also the errors, the negative results and the associated enrichment provided, that is, what Bachelard calls "the negative result of positivity," which is part of "the exterior of science" Foucault has shown; and finally the discourse of that researcher about these productions. The material of this methodology is therefore the emerging phenomena of the movement of research, what it secretes, and our methodology, an empirical phenomenology of heterogeneity.
In this paper, we are taking into account Bachelard's "technical phenomenology" (Bachelard, Le nouvel 13), and find inspiration from the empirical phenomenology Anne Fagot-Largeault applied with most success in her epistemology of medicine in L'homme bio-éthique (1985) . By "technical phenomenology," Bachelard understands an approach analyzing the production of phenomena. This is an extension to phenomenology as it includes into its concept the conditions of its application. Moreover, Bachelard proposes a "technical materialism" in Le rationalism appliqué (1949) by integrating not only the methodological strategy employed, but also all "the methods," as parts of subjective conditions of the experimental process. Anne Fagot-Largeault developed an approach based on a precise analysis of the use of naturalism in epistemology and ethics, and proposes a scientific use of observable natural regulations compatible with the exercise of human freedom and will (Fagot-Largeault, 1993 and 1997) . By pursuing this epistemological path, we defend the possibility of a transdisciplinary approach including not only the subjectivity inherent to methods but to all secretions due to the production process, from the lab researcher to her biotechnological productions. What we propose here is an empirical phenomenology where there is no need to oppose scientific and social practices. On the contrary, this empirical phenomenology is dedicated both to biology and to local bio-technical matters but also to the anthropological and psychological matters of cloning.
Ideology, distance and positioning
Consequently, by approaching this heterogeneity of matters, our work meets several difficulties in terms of positioning the lab researcher and objects. In terms of the first, by expecting to catch the emerging phenomena from the cloning research area, we will stand in the area to be near the process itself, as it is not possible to observe it from the outside. What arises then is the question of the starting point of an analysis of heterogeneous objects: do we want to have a critical analysis or do we want to make the genealogy of an emerging phenomenon? As Foucault explains, this question concerns analyses of discourses, and it is quite impossible to separate both aspects of analysis. While doing a genealogy of the apparition of discourses, we will necessarily come to the point of identifying specific exclusion criteria and constraints that help the emergence as well as the particular obstacles in the process of discourse production (Foucault, 1971 ). As we chose an internal positioning, we will adopt a genealogist perspective at first in order to renew and complete as best as we can the list of epistemological matters to analyze. By doing so, we will automatically encounter both ideology and delimitation of the scientific area.
The definition of ideology by Canguilhem in Idéologie et Rationalité dans les sciences de la vie (1977) can help us in this respect: "it is the ignorance that a critical knowledge of its project and of its object, is first achieved thanks to a distance towards its already established object" (my translation). To avoid ideology, the relevant points are as follows: which distance is relevant, to which observer and for what "already established object"? The question is first, how to elaborate the definition of objects? Bachelard, in Le nouvel esprit scientifique (1934) , explains that science does not take into account the philosophical definition of object, but rather binds together the concept of doubt and the concept of datum into a process of objectification. Analyzing Bachelard's epistemology, Dominique Lecourt (1969) , explains that the objectivity of the scientific knowledge is guaranteed by its discursivity. That means there is both an intuitive value and a discursive value in the construction of object. The object, therefore, appears no longer like a simple result of objectification but as an instrument that "operates phenomena," emerging during the research process.
Then come the questions of the position of the analyst of these emerging phenomena and of the distance she will keep towards the established object. Ideology may be internal or external, depending on the position of the analyst, but will always be caused by the lack of a necessary distance towards the object of knowledge. As we see it, Canguilhem himself does not avoid the possibility of having a critical distance even from an internal position. In our position, by standing in the field of cloning we are benefiting from a privileged situation to understand the results and what they convey in terms of biological, technical, anthropological and psychological enrichment. This internal positioning also allows the observation of the local emergence of ideologies, called internal ideologies, and at the same time an increased risk of lacking a critical distance allowing a correct understanding of what is really emerging. Moreover, from a genealogist point of view, local ideologies and "ghosts" standing in the confines of the scientific process of investigation will be also included into the list of emerging phenomena, since the fear or confusion they convey is also a vital part of science secretions. Consequently, as we are standing in such a close proximity with such phenomena, there will be indeed a need for critical distance in order to avoid uncritically accepting them as such. While being aware of this risk, we propose a preliminary genealogy of emerging phenomena including a time of analysis requiring a distant positioning and a critical refinement in identification of objects. We mean here that philosophy will interfere into science, not at first in the definition of objects as we said, but in their redefinition.
Psychology of local ideology and new conceptualizations
Epistemology, as explained by Bachelard, has to respect the very movement of knowledge while being established in a dialectical manner. Cloning secretions cannot be separate from the act of research itself, as they co-emerge during the event of research. Within the act of research, during the experiment and before interpretation, something from the lab researcher is embedding in a normative fashion the emerging research process as whole, and can therefore be polemic depending on what becomes of the experiment: failure or success. Let us enter into the cloning scheme in order to provide a draft of cloning secretions. We must then give all the importance we can to the event itself and its immediate effects, that is, to the history of the cloning events. As we will see, in this scheme we have surprising results as, for instance, the variability in epigenetic marks in clones we presented previously, which are unexpected by definition and will be transformed in a subjective manner by the lab researcher. We also have the re-conceptualizations these results imply, the ignorance they reveal, the confusion or fear they convey with all associated behaviors, the understanding they may offer, and finally, the discourses created as a direct consequence of their happening.
Let us start with the new conceptualizations associated with the interpretation of results. We will focus our attention on two major concepts. The first re-conceptualization is about identity. Clones were assumed to be identical genetically, most of all because that constitutes their basic definition. Experimental facts show now that this assumption has not been completely achieved because some spontaneous mutations may appear, with every single genome having its own history, and because the cloning technique itself has an impact on the genome of the resulting beings (de Montera et al., 2010) . According to these data, the identity of clones must be rethought and, consequently, so does the clone definition based on the previous concept of identity. The clone is often born with a collection of differences and abnormalities and the reaction of scientists (who are primarily interested in the technique production and its success) and of animal keepers (primarily interested in having a healthy animal that will survive) is disappointment on one hand, and concern and care on the other. At first, clone identity did not appear as a scientific and positive definition but as a concept carrying negative values of living. For example, in our lab, it was established that cloned calves would only be considered "normal" three months after birth because of high mortality and abnormalities occurring in the first months of age (Chavatte-Palmer et al., 2002) . Then, another aspect of clone identity was revealed: a clone affirms its difference by its novelty. In other words, the variability it exhibits is clone-specific. Being a clone is not therefore a participation in the concept of identity but rather in a new kind of specificity that includes a widening of internal variability. Strikingly, the specificity of the redefined identity of clones may be this ability to vary. More precisely, the paradox can be explained as following: the will to have an identical being has become the living condition of clones and also the condition for appearance of an unprecedented ability for internal variations and plasticity towards environment.
The second occurring re-conceptualization is about a new kind of possibility revealed by cloning: what kind of possible emerges from the technique when the alliance between nature and biotechnology creates a new way of valorizing the environment by inventing new modes of regulation? This notion of possible does not come from nature, since reproduction without fertilization between male and female gametes in mammals did not exist in the reality before man's invention of nuclear transfer technology. As such, Leibniz, for example, would have said that clones were unnatural. Nevertheless, this possible does not come from the technique, that is, from man, since embryo development is only induced by electric pulses and continues by using its own regulations. This possible therefore emerges as a co-creation between human acts of research and natural becoming (de Montera, 2007) . Further, the clone as "possible," is challenging the common way of understanding the valorization of environment. As Canguilhem explains so well, not only humans but the living in general valorize the environment, since through the act of living, they interact with the medium by displaying preferences (Canguilhem, 1965) .
What sounds most surprising is to observe a new mode of valorization for the new living beings that are clones. We assume that after the cloning process, the cloned embryo undertakes a series of regulations appearing as aberrant from the outside-that is, for the lab researcher-but which might be inventions of a new way of being natural. These two examples of re-conceptualization help us better understand the cloning secretions in terms of new ideas, new concepts and new lines of inquiry. But we need to understand not only the rational outcomes but also the psychological and emotional ones.
We will therefore try to sketch a psychology of the scientific spirit and practice belonging to researchers working in the cloning field. Bachelard said about the psychology of the contemporaneous scientific spirit that it was a "synthesis of metaphysical contradictions" (Bachelard, Le nouvel 4). More simply here, we propose to analyze manifestations of the psychology of cloning scientists and experimenters, which will involve in part their ideology. We will define ideology here not as the science of the genesis of ideas as Cabanis did, but according to Canguilhem, as a shifting in the application point of science (Canguilhem, 1977) . What is interesting, therefore, is to follow, and if possible, understand this move. By doing so, we agree with Canguilhem, that ideology in science has its own history within the history of science and we assume that ideology has also its own psychology depending on the local environment. In a cloning team, we could observe two axes of psychological reactions: a communication axis, and a censoring axis.
In the communication axis, there is mainly a discourse toward the public in order to justify the use of a technique displaying a success rate below 5%. This was done by providing a list of applications that would be helpful because no technique except cloning can offer them. There are two arguments: to do what only cloning can do-but not asking whether we need to do so-and to encourage cloning research because of the promised successes, a discourse that has the characteristics of marketing and that can be explained by the growing competition between laboratories in biotechnologies around the planet. This communication reaction displays both an external vocation and an efficiency outside the scientific area; it is, finally, a social practice with no need for an internal scientific foundation.
In addition to the communication axis, we can observe emerging local behaviors of protection that belong to a censoring attitude that itself is part of local and emerging ideologies. According to us, this censoring attitude may be analyzed as two different wills: a will of protection and a will of breaking limits. The will of protection is translated as a self-censorship to mask the creative process. By doing so, it would also automatically be masked for a phenomenological approach of cloning that would not have included psychological matters. The problem is that this attempt to protect rational and technical secretions-that is, basically, new ideas-of cloning, as if they were considered research secrets and tricks, will become a mask for the new emerging scientific field normally revealed through science secretions. Protecting a field too much would therefore be like obstructing the revelation of both destination and localization of the science to come. The will for breaking limits, on another hand, has an unnamed enemy: epistemology. Indeed, it is difficult to accept what works against that which is emerging from inventions, like the philosophy of action. Why not accept the absolute injunction to act and go on researching? Bachelard described the "epistemological obstacle" as a philosophical intervention that threatens the organization of a pre-established way of thinking (Bachelard, Le nouvel 53). It seems that the fascination for a work able to produce phenomena that might become real events can be transformed into a trap of action for the sake of action.
A genealogical approach looking at emergence of discourses internal and external to the limit drawn by the control on discourse (Foucault, 1971 ) has allowed us to reveal the paradoxical movement of research in the cloning field, which is an iterative process between speaking out and keeping silent on these matters. The role of censorship as explained by Foucault is to control the random event in science in order to prevent any danger of further discourse escaping from a will of protection. Research scientists, like actors making the film of research, seem to balance between the temptation of marketing and the temptation of epistemology.
Result of a phenomenological epistemology of cloning secretions
Let us summarize the result of our approach of cloning secretions. We can now come back to the questions arising from the study on adult clones: first, considering the crucial role of DNA methylation in transgenerational effects; these data were considered important in understanding more precisely the nature of clones and the impact of cloning on the genome of clones during their lives and for their descendants. Second, the inefficient inactivation of undesirables sequences located in the genome was a topic of worry. What is at stake is the uncontrollable number and effects of the new modes of regulation invented by clones during their interaction with the median norm.
We can summarize cloning outcomes as follows. Cloning displays one objective: identity. It hides, however, another one: meliorism. A third outcome is emerging, unexpected, and problematic, but with great prom-ise: the unprecedented plasticity of a biotechnological production. The resulting genome plasticity in response to environmental constraints is a new scientific object that has not been "already established," to reference Canguilhem. Scientists are therefore in the ideological stage of cloning knowledge and incapable of providing an adequate discourse. We propose then the following scenario of the cloning strategy. As we reported, in bovine clones the cloning objective is to induce a simplification of selection procedure for breeding by reproducing, as much as wanted, selected interesting genotypes. The result is nevertheless an emergence of uncontrollable epigenetic variation. Furthermore, cloning is dealing with animal bodies, but no one can reasonably scientifically guarantee that cloning the body is like cloning the performance. Despite the fact that the cloned body might display differences or abnormalities, we wonder if objective cloning is exclusively reproduction of a given body in several identical exemplars working identically. Should the selected genotype be absolutely multiplied, or should some genetic features be selected for further amelioration? Forgetting problems of unfaithful reproduction of genetic features or performance, it is indeed possible that cloning plasticity become a positive argument when one claims that a clone is an adaptable animal, thus solving our future problems of climate and food. Finally, to clone a being is seen as progress. Most of all and despite the lack of success in reproduction, cloning conveys a regeneration phantasm, or a phantasm of getting better genes.
By undertaking such phenomenological approach, we take responsibility for a certain ambiguity. As Canguilhem said, ideology can only be qualified subsequent to its disqualification as science by a discourse showing its ability through integration of results (Canguilhem, 1977) . We hope that our integration of these results with epistemology meaningfully unveils the ideology of the cloning project. With this ambiguous positioning of our approach, we need to be modest about our pretentions. Our strategy dealing with a complex field such as cloning and most polemic objects such as clones, and what "secretions" they convey while they are being produced, will not provide any criteria for establishing what the truth is. Instead, we propose here the inclusion of the role of intuition without the need of proof, as the only way to be aware of the creative part of science secretions. The will of truth, as explained by Foucault, is supported by the institution. If the unveiling comes from a critical point of view separated from the institution, we defend the fact that it can be, all the same, internal. Having said that, we assume that science secretions are ultimately a philosophical matter: "sciences secrete philosophy" (Lecourt 25).
Emerging assemblages and pre-political topology in biotechnology research
One main function of philosophy is to neutralize ideologies by providing a way to make a distinction between scientific practices and scientific discourses. But some scientific disciplines can display modes of creativity that are not reducible to areas of science. By that we don't mean here the external intervention of philosophy as a critical operation, but on the contrary, the emanation of questions with philosophical scope, making possible new kinds of epistemological assemblages. This is the case with genomics as describes by Mark Hunyadi (2004) . What induces the interest and range of new conceptualizations in the cloning field is not only the issue of reproduction but, most of all, the genomic scale of such technical intervention. To the power of reproduction, genomics is adding the power to shape the characteristics of beings, resulting in what Hunyadi calls the plasticity of human nature. But there will be no necessity to choose between two kinds of epistemological assemblage.
As Bachelard reminds us, the role of thought in the pre-existing movement of research itself must be preserved. In some cases, the entry of normativity during experimentation is apprehended by reason before detection by observation. Genomics may secrete normativity but, in some cases, only a philosophical intervention at the appropriate time allows the definition of a new place and destination (topos) for science. This is the case, for example, when the internalization of a suburb of science is anticipated by philosophical analysis, as in a preview. By doing so, philosophy has a role in science's main activity for research: the "definition of domains of objects" (Foucault 72) , which Foucault analyses as a project for a philosophy challenging a scientific area, and dealing with the "regional rationalities of science" (78). Indeed, while going further in the redefinition of scientific objects, objects become an assemblage of science and philosophy. At that point, we do not stay in structuralism, but rather stand in a phenomenological "transrationality," using Bachelard's word for the description of knowledge reorganization (Bachelard, Le nouvel 72). Transrational reorganization is possible by keeping scientific "audace" (daring) and by conceiving new topos for research action.
The emergence of an assemblage between scientific practices, philosophical reflection and norms, reminds us of the "complicity" between biological norm and social norm described by Anne Fagot-Largeault (1993) . The living reactualize values and norms, while society discusses them. Having said that, it seems difficult to talk about compatible regulation between science and society. Yet, as Anne Fagot-Largeault points out, society is capable of self-regulation and the experimental control of science headways is inextricably scientific and ethical. Consequently, in this assemblage we must be aware that these norms come from man and not from nature and that a society must stay free to choose in order to avoid moral relativism; the viability of the decision, on the other hand, will be a sanction of reality (Fagot-Largeault, 1997) . We are therefore facing what appears as an assemblage of philosophy and something political in the same scientific topology. We hypothesize that it is a pre-political emergence, as its structure comes from an assemblage and not yet from an organized strategy.
In order to understand better the role of philosophy in such an assemblage, let us use a common feature between philosophy definitions by Bachelard and Alain Badiou: philosophy is a dialectic reorganization of knowledge for Bachelard (1934) and a reorganization of practices and discourses proposing new values built beyond common values for Badiou (La relation 24). Therefore, both philosophers understand the philosophical intervention as dialectic and creative. Let us go deeper into the understanding of the role of philosophy in the construction of mixed assemblages. By identifying the topology of an event, we deal with the interval of random variations and the conditions of possibility, which become possible norms for action. But by doing so, we also choose a new way of applying a historical perspective revealing the importance of the event in biotechnological science. Within a topology, which we could say is "open to creativity," and using the process described by Foucault between Life and History (Foucault, 1969) , we propose to describe the creative process of research in biotechnology as following: it starts from phenomena (Life), going through production and analysis of biological events (assemblage of Technique, Science and History), co-creating at the same time an internal discourse that has to pass the trial of censoring and reality (Pre-political and Human Life). A remaining question at this point: is this compatible with a democratic use of philosophy?
Biophilosophy and pre-political forms of collective action
If the topology of biotechnology allows for a pre-political assemblage, it is because of a certain freedom that seems not directly compatible with the quest for universal truth. Do we have to consider, then, that the biotechnical topology is out of the range of collective action and democracy? Alain Badiou explains that, in philosophy, democracy is a necessity upstream but a difficulty downstream because of the problematic connection between a democratic notion of freedom and the philosophical notion of truth (2011). We can say that Philosophy, in absolute terms, should only hold its legitimacy from the content of the discourse, and not from the speaker, which is not the case in science where forms of constraint associated with hierarchy and science-area delimitation are applied, as Foucault shows (Foucault, 1971) . In other words, if the opinion of the philosopher does not count, the opinion of the scientist does, and the difference emerges in the objective that is pursued. The objective of philosophy is the universality of the truth. Therefore, at first sight, it seems impossible to ask for such an objective in the pre-political topology of science.
Yet, hopefully philosophy takes advantage of hybridization in such matters. In the biotechnological field, philosophy is engaged in something quite different than a traditional quest for the truth, which is, through the hybridization of biology, the creative thinking of secretions. Here we propose to consider the emerging engineered objects: bioproductions, as hybrids of biology and philosophy, because, as we have shown, production is not separable from technique. Bioproductions as hybrids, moreover, allow for the emergence of norms that still carry the history of their process of "individuation" (Simondon, 1995; de Montera, 2007) A biophilosophy taking responsibility from its own pre-political dimension would be flexible enough to allow the accord between freedom and a certain will of justice in the practical area of politics. In the cloning field, such a project seems possible, provided that the role of philosophy for anticipation and creation is respected, and not treated as an obstacle to the free will to perform research, or to seek knowledge about life, which is and must continue to be the very engine of research and of thought in general.
A democratic metamorphosis of biophilosophy is conceivable if the right place (topos) is created for trans-rationality, and in analogical fashion by using the same flexible process used by performance art, allowing in one place, at the appropriate time, the emergence of pre-political creativity. This flexible process derived from an assemblage of biological and techno-scientific matters uses interbreeding between rationalities and practices. This flexible interbreeding constitutes a plastic form of justice towards our ability to exceed both vital and social determinations-and therefore the very frontiers between disciplines. This process emerges within a growing ambient complexity as an ethical project to offer new symbolic and pre-political forms for collectivity, beyond the opposition between law and desire. 
